Actual possession of nuclear weapons would aid in the survival of the clerical regime - as the North Korean case made clear - and protect Irans efforts to involve itself in radical endeavors elsewhere in the Muslim world; indeed, the enormous prestige of being a nuclear power would enhance the latter project.
In short, Ahmadinejad has no good reason to agree to our condition to suspend enrichment. Thus it is most unlikely that there will be negotiations on our terms.
If there are negotiations, they are likely to be among ourselves - among the United States, the Europeans, Russia and China. There may be several subjects of these negotiations, but the most crucial will be whether to drop our demand for a cessation of enrichment.
While Im persuaded that Iranian "civil society" is interestingly pro-American in some respects, Fradkin has me convinced that Ahmadinejad is not the marginal figure some claim and that Iran is likely to be "our" problem for quite some time.